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What is traditional international law on the jus ad bellum 1 and thejus
in bello ?2 How has self-determination evolved from a principle of polit-
ical thought to a right in international law? Is the use of force by na-
tional liberation movements to secure the right of their peoples to self-
determination legitimate? To what extent does the jus in bello apply in
wars of national liberation? These questions are the focus of inquiry in
Heather Wilson's recent book International Law and the Use of Force by
National Liberation Movements.
Divided into four sections, the text initially discusses the nature and
function of international law, and gives a historical synopsis of tradi-
tional international law norms relating to thejus ad bellum. The second
part is devoted exclusively to the concept of self-determination and its
present status in the international legal order. Parts three and four, the
most important sections of the book, discuss thejus ad bellum and the
jus in bello relating to wars of national liberation. The book concludes
with a detailed and comprehensive bibliography.
Despite the complexity of the subject matter, International Law and
the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements is concisely written
and lucid in style. A wide range of international literature and sources
are integrated into the text as well as the footnotes. It must be stressed,
t Defense Planner with the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels.
t LL.B., University of Ghana; LL.M., Queen's University, Canada; LL.M., Yale Law
School; J.S.D. Candidate, Yale Law School.
1. Jus ad bellum refers to the authority to resort to force.
2. Jus in bello denotes the rules applicable in an armed conflict.
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however, that a book as brief as Wilson's cannot do more than begin to
suggest the possible contours of inquiry into this fascinating area of pub-
lic international law. Although the introductory chapters are well writ-
ten, the more important sections of the book fail in several critical
respects. First, the author restricts her discussion of state practice to
events of the distant past, devoting hardly any attention to developments
of the last decade. Worse yet, the author describes important issues per-
taining to the use of force by national liberation movements without tak-
ing a position on any of the conflicting legal and policy arguments at
stake. Unfortunately, the few times Wilson does state her beliefs, she
makes conclusory statements that are contradicted by other assertions in
the book. These basic defects seriously undermine the value of the work
as a whole.
I. Traditional International Law on the Jus ad Bellum
and the Jus in Bello
Wilson states in the first part of her book that "[tjhe idea that only a
sovereign state may legitimately wage war seems a foregone conclusion
in the twentieth century."' 3 Such an absolute and conclusory statement is
surprising and troubling in a book whose goal is to determine whether
the use of force by national liberation movements is legitimate. The
statement contradicts the author's introductory acknowledgement that in
the last forty years ideas about what constitutes war and which entities in
international politics may wage war have changed. 4 In fact, the idea that
sovereign states have the exclusive right to wage war was a foregone con-
clusion only through the first half of this century. The very notion of war
during that period was inextricably linked to the concept of statehood.
In an oft-quoted statement, war was defined as "a contention between
two or more States through their armed forces, for the purpose of over-
powering each other and imposing such conditions of peace as the victor
pleases." 5
State practice in the twentieth century, however, suggests that this
state-based notion of war has undergone substantial modification. The
terms "armed conflict" and "the use of force" have increasingly been
used in lieu of the term "war."' 6 Traditionally defined, the rules of inter-
3. H. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE By NATIONAL LIBERA-
TION MOVEMENTS 14 (1988) [hereinafter WILSON].
4. WILSON, at 1.
5. L. OPPENHEIM, II INTERNATIONAL LAW 202 (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952).
6. For example, each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions uses the term "armed conflict"
in their respective second article. See Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions:
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
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national law neither condemned nor condoned the use of force within
national boundaries against an established government.7 As aptly sum-
marized by Wilson, insurgents had limited, rights and duties -within the
territory that they occupied, but belligerents had rights within their terri-
tory and with respect to third states.8
A fmdamental precept of the law of war is the distinction between the
jus ad bellum and thejus in bello. Traditionally, thejus in bello was only
intended to mitigate the pernicious effects of war, and not to sanction the
use of force by any state or entity. Nevertheless, ,the jus in bello often
included provisions relating to entities which were not states stricto
sensu. Article 4A(2) of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, for
example, includes among those entitled to prisoner of war status mem-
bers of militias and other organized resistance movements affiliated with
"a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory,"
provided such organized resistance movements fulfill certain conditions.9
There is evidence to suggest that the drafters of the Geneva Conven-
tions did not intend to include conflicts which have subsequently come
to be known as wars of national liberation10 in the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions.11 Wilson rightly concludes that Article 4A(2) of the Geneva Con-
in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention on Wounded Armed Forces in the Field]; Convention for the Ameliora-
tion of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention on Wounded Armed Forces at Sea]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinaf-
ter Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Geneva Convention on Protection of Civilians].
For an example of the use of the term "use of force," see U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
7. WILSON, at 29.
8. Id. "Insurgents" generally refers to those who rise up in an insurrection against the
constituted authorities. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 726 (5th ed. 1979). "Belligerents,"
on the other hand, are a body of insurgents who by reason of their temporary organized gov-
ernment, are regarded as conducting lawful hostilities. Ha at 141.
9. The conditions included: being commanded by a person responsible for his subordi-
nates; having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; carrying arms openly; and
conducting operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. See Geneva Conven-
tion on Prisoners of War, supra note 6, at art. 4A, para. 2.
10. Wilson describes a war of national liberation as "a conflict waged by a non-State com-
munity against an established government to secure the right of the people of that community
to self-determination." WILSON, at 1-2 (footnote omitted).
11. See, e.g., Summary Record of the 4th Meeting, VIII OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIP-
LOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS, GENEVA 1974-1977, CDDH/I/
SR.4 at 29, para. 25 (Fed. Pol. Dept. Bern, 1978) [hereinafter OFF. Rcs.] (statement by Mr.
Draper) ("The Geneva Conventions and the draft Protocols had been devised for entities capa-
ble of applying them: in other words, States. Obviously, the application of many of the provi-
sions of the Geneva Conventions could not be extended to national liberation movements
... ."). See also id. CDDH/I/SR.3 at 22, para. 38 (statement by Mr. Cassese) ("[Ihe word
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vention on Prisoners of War was drafted to remedy a problem of
occupation, not national liberation. 12 She might, however, have added
that such provisions, while not intended to sanction the use of force by
national liberation movements, recognized the fact that the use of force
in international relations was not the exclusive preserve of states. Non-
state entities such as national liberation movements also resorted to mili-
tary force, whether or not they had legal authority to do so. Wilson's
book might have appeared more sequential and systematic had she ac-
knowledged this fact in the conclusion of the first part, thus justifying her
subsequent discussions on self-determination and the legitimacy of the
use of force by national liberation movements.
II. Self-Determination in Contemporary International Law
Part two of International Law and the Use of Force by National Libera-
tion Movements commences with contradictory and conclusory state-
ments. After accurately noting that one of the most controversial issues
in international law since the end of World War II has been "whether
self-determination is a right in international law or simply a principle of
political thought which has assumed great prominence in international
affairs," 13 Wilson curiously states that her intention is to examine first
"how self-determination developed into a legal right, and secondly, who
the 'self' is that can exercise this right."1 4 Thus, Wilson summarily con-
cludes that self-determination is a legal right, but fails to mention that
arguments to the contrary exist. Professor Leo Gross, for example, has
observed that:
[S]ubsequent practice as an element of interpretation does not support the
proposition that the principle of self-determination is to be interpreted as a
right or that the human rights provisions have come to be interpreted as
rights with corresponding obligations either generally or specifically with
respect to the right to self-determination.15
Recent state practice and juristic opinions suggest that the view repre-
sented by Professor Gross is not a majority view.16 This is clearly
'Powers' used in the third paragraph of Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions could only mean
States and not authorities other than States.").
12. WILSON, at 20. Wilson concedes that there are situations in which belligerent occupa-
tion and wars of national liberation overlap. Id Namibia after the withdrawal of the mandate
and the Moroccan occupation of the Western Sahara are arguable examples. Id.
13. Id at 55.
14. Id.
15. For a comparison of this and other positions, see Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM.
J. INT'L L. 459, 460-61 (1971).
16. In fact, Professor Gross has subsequently modified his view. See L. GROss, I ESSAYS
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 257 (1984) ("This right [of self-determina-
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brought out in Wilson's discussion of the development of self-determina-
tion to the present day.17 Although self-determination has more ancient
historical roots, the concept is usually traced to President Woodrow Wil-
son's address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress in 1918.18 Self-deter-
mination, in its contemporary acceptance, was first mentioned in Articles
1(2) and 55 of the U.N. Charter. 19 Chapters XI and XII of the Charter
also contain implicit references to self-determination and its implementa-
tion in the international legal system.20
The historical analysis of self-determination is not unique to Wilson's
book. Indeed, there is a burgeoning literature on the evolution of the
concept. 21 What makes this book useful is its attempt to explore the
right to self-determination and its effect on the law of war. It discusses
the extent to which the concept of self-determination has conditioned
emerging norms on thejus ad bellum. Unfortunately Wilson fails to ad-
dress one very important issue-the position of neutral or third parties in
wars of national liberation.22 As discussed below, the proposition that
national liberation movements can resort to the use of force is controver-
sial. Even more controversial, however, is the question of whether na-
tional liberation movements are entitled to third party assistance in their
fight for self-determination. Although the question relates to the right of
tion] is well established in international law although its scope and range have not been pre-
cisely defined.").
17. See WILSON, at 55-88.
18. For the text of the speech, see I THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 180 (R.
Baker & W. Dodd eds. 1927).
19. One of the stated purposes of the United Nations is "[t]o develop friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples .... ." U.N. CHARTER art. I, para. 2. See also id. art. 55 (United Nations shall
promote specified objectives with a view to creating conditions conducive to "peaceful and
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples. .. ").
20. See U.N. CHARTER ch. XI ("Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territo-
ries."); id. ch. XII ("International Trusteeship System").
21. See, e.g., M. POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE: THE
NEW DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED NATIONS (1982); W. OFUATEY-KoDJOE, THE PRINCIPLE
OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1977).
22. WILSON, at 91 ("Although these situations are important, particularly the relationship
of other States to a people denied self-determination, they are not the focus of this book.").
Another weakness in Wilson's book is her failure to discuss the right of self-determination in
relation to secessionist struggles and the principle of maintaining borders inherited at indepen-
dence uti possidetis juris. As discussed by the International Court of Justice in its recent
Burkina Faso/Mali frontier dispute judgment, the right to self-determination is in prima facie
conflict with the principle of uti possidetis. See Concerning The Frontier Dispute (Burkina
Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 564-67 (Judgment of Dec. 22) ("At first sight this principle [of
utipossidetis] conflicts outright with another one, the right of peoples to self-determination....
The essential requirement of stability in order to survive, to develop and gradually to consoli-
date their independence in all fields, has induced African States judiciously to consent to the
respecting of colonial frontiers, and to take account of it in the interpretation of the principle
of self-determination of peoples." Id. at 567, para. 25.).
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states, and not national liberation movements, to use force, such use of
force is predicated on acceptance of the concept of self-determination as
applied to national liberation movements.
Scholars are divided on this issue. One school of thought, represented
by Professor Reisman, argues that self-determination is "the fundamen-
tal principle of political legitimacy in contemporary international poli-
tics" and "the main purpose of contemporary international law."'23
Under this theory, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter notwithstanding,
states may resort to the use of unilateral coercion for the "enhancement
of the ongoing right of peoples to determine their own political desti-
nies."24 Other authors strongly oppose this view. While agreeing with
Reisman that self-determination is (or at least should be) a key principle
of political legitimacy, Oscar Schachter takes issue with Reisman's asser-
tion that states may assist other peoples in the "enhancement" of "ongo-
ing self-determination." He argues that Reisman's position would
introduce "a new normative basis for recourse to war that would give
powerful states an almost unlimited right to overthrow governments al-
leged to be unresponsive to the popular will or to the goal of self-determi-
nation. ' 25 Lloyd Cutler takes a third position. Coming down between
Reisman and Schachter, Cutler agrees with Reisman that Article 2(4)
must be reconciled with the stated purposes of the United Nations to
promote self-determination and free elections. 26 He agrees with
Schachter, however, that Article 2(4) cannot be read to give other states
an unlimited right to topple a repressive regime by force.21 Cutler inter-
prets Article 2(4) as permitting a third state to intervene only when two
conditions exist: "an indigenous pro-democratic insurgency is engaged in
a civil war with the repressive regime," and "some other third state has
been giving military assistance to the repressive regime."'28
This debate has crucial implications for a discussion of self-determina-
tion and national 'liberation movements. Wilson's failure to discuss it
seriously undermines the value of her book as a whole. This omission is
especially regrettable since Wilson herself shows in the third part of her
book that the issue has been extensively debated in the United Nations.
23. Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 642, 643 (1984).
24. Id
25. Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645, 649
(1984).
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III. The Use of Force by National Liberation Movements
A discussion of the legitimacy of the use of force by national liberation
movements forms the pith and marrow of Wilson's book. International
Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements is filled with
information that is vital to an understanding of the current debate. Con-
siderable space is devoted to the various international prescriptions and
the practice of states pertaining to the use of force by national liberation
movements. Unfortunately Wilson once again fails to take a position.
The reader is therefore left wondering how much evidentiary value
should be attached to Wilson's discussion of state practice.
The argument that national liberation movements have the authority
to use force in pursuit of self-determination challenges Wilson's earlier
assertion that only sovereign states may legitimately use force.29 Wilson
therefore has to concede that "there is some support for the use of force
by national liberation movements to be included on the short list of situa-
tions in which the use of force is legitimate."' 30 Indeed, she continues,
"[t]here is also evidence that many States have not only acquiesced to the
use of force by these movements, but actively support their use of force
both politically and by more practical means."'31 Wilson finds it ade-
quate merely to describe state practice, rather than evaluate the evidence
and come to a conclusion as to the present state of the law governing the
use of force by national liberation movements.
What theories account for the practice of state and non-state entities,
and what legal authority is there to support such practice? Several Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions have been cited by states in support of the
proposition that national liberation movements are entitled to use
force.32 The locus classicus of these U.N. resolutions is the 1970 Declara-
tion on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations.33 The Declaration recognizes the legitimacy of resort to
armed force by national liberation movements and calls upon member
states to contribute moral and material assistance to such movements. It
states in relevant part:
29. See supra text accompanying note 3.
30. WILSON, at 92.
31. Id.
32. See generally Abi-Saab, Wars of National Liberation in the Geneva Conventions and
Protocols, 165 (IV) RECUEIL DES COURS 357, 366-92 (1981).
33. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)
[hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations].
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Every state has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives
peoples. . . of their right to self-determination and freedom and indepen-
dence. In their actions against and resistance to such forcible action in pur-
suit of the exercise of self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek
and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of
the Charter.
34
The Declaration on Friendly Relations is supported by the United
States and is frequently referred to by states and by the International
Court of Justice as a codification of contemporary international law.35
Georges Abi-Saab and other well-known authors have concluded from
this Declaration that armed resistance to forcible denial of self-determi-
nation is legitimate.3 6 However, as Wilson rightly points out, the Decla-
ration does not expressly say that peoples may use force to secure their
right to self-determination. 37 Neither does it expressly mention armed
resistance. The absence of the word "armed," pace Wilson, leaves the
idea of resistance ambiguous, which was no doubt the intention of the
participants.
3
Wilson's attitude toward the effect of this Declaration is equivocal.
Although she does an admirable job of setting out the arguments for and
against the legal effect of this "ambitious codification of contemporary
international law [that] has been widely accepted, ' 39 Wilson leaves the
reader with a feeling of dissatisfaction by failing to present an in-depth
discussion of subsequent state practice and juristic opinions. She also
avoids stating a position on any of the conflicting legal and policy issues
at stake. She could have made her discussion more relevant by applying
the issues involved to recent situations of conflict, such as the mujahidin
in Afghanistan, 40 or the SouthWest Africa People's Organization
34. Id.,
35. Reisman, Old Wine in New Bottles: The Reagan and Brezhnev Doctrines in Contempo-
rary International Law and Practice, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 171, 191 (1988).
36. WILSON, at 98.
37. Id. at 99.
38. Id.
39. Reisman, The Resistance in Afghanistan Is Engaged in a War of National Liberation,
81 AM. J. INT'L L. 906, 908 (1987).
40. Reisman has suggested that the Declaration on Friendly Relations establishes the fol-
lowing coordinate international rights and obligations as between the parties in the nearly
concluded Afghan conflict:
1. the mujahidin are entitled to fight against the Soviet Union and the Soviet-supported
Government in Kabul;
2. the mujahidin are entitled to call upon third states for support in their struggle;
3. third states are under an obligation to provide such help to the mujahidin in their
resistance; and
4. neither the Soviet Union nor the Soviet-supported Government in Kabul is entitled to
characterize the support that third states are obliged to and do, in fact, render to the
mujahidin as a violation of international law or in any way a violation of its own rights.
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(SWAPO) in Namibia.41
Various arguments have been adduced in justification of the use bf
force by national liberation movements. Several Third World states ar-
gue that there is a right of self-defense against racist and colonial domi-
nation, and that if force is used to deprive subjected peoples of their right
to self-determination, they have a right to resort to counter-force and to
receive support from other states.42 For example, the African states
claim that the use of force to prevent and respond to violations of the
norms of decolonization and anti-racism is self-defense, and that the use
of armed force is justified to implement self-determination, provided this
result cannot be achieved by peaceful means.43 This position is not justi-
fied by the U.N. Charter. To be sure, colonialism and racist domination
do not, per se, involve an "armed attack" on subjected peoples. Never-
theless, state practice supports the argument that the use of force is justi-
fied to implement self-determination.44 The international community has
manifested a high degree of tolerance for the activities of national libera-
tion movements in general, particularly in their fight for freedom and
self-determination, and Wilson admits that "the trend over the last four
decades and since 1960 in particular has been toward the extension of the
authority to use force to national liberation movements.
'45
Id at 909.
41. For a discussion of the relevance of the Declaration on Friendly Relations to the
Namibian conflict, see generally Kwakwa, The Namibian Conflict: A Discussion of the Jus ad
Bellum and the Jus in Bello, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. - (forthcoming 1989).
It is also instructive to note that in the Namibia case, one of the judges went so far as to state
that resort to force in pursuit of self-determination has become a custom within the ambit of
Article 38(l)(b) of the ICI Statute. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Pres-
ence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Reso-
lution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 1, 74 (Ammoun, concurring) ("If there is any 'general practice'
which might be held, beyond dispute, to constitute law within the meaning of Article 38,
paragraph 1(b), of the Statute of the Court, it must surely be that which is made up of the
conscious action of the peoples themselves, engaged in a determined struggle.").
42. Kwakwa, South Africa's May 1986 Military Incursions into Neighboring African States,
12 YALE J. INT'L L. 421, 436-37 (1987).
43. Id.
44. For example, in 1961, India used force to end Portuguese colonial domination of Goa.
India argued at the Security Council that the Portuguese military occupation in 1510 did not
confer good title, and force could be used to achieve freedom when no other means were
available. See I REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS 147-48 (Supp. No.
3 1972). As Wilson rightly notes, the Security Council failed to condemn the Indian action in
Goa. WILSON, at 131. The inability of the Security Council to censure India, she might have
added, had the effect of fortifying certain state expectations that the use of force for the express
purpose of national liberation is legitimate.
45. WILSON, at 136.
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IV. The Jus in Bello in Wars of National Liberation
One of the most controversial issues in the law of armed conflict today
is the question of application ratione materiae, or material field of appli-
cation-whether wars of national liberation are international armed con-
flicts, and the extent to which the laws of armed conflict apply to them.
Wilson deserves commendation for providing insight into the legal and
policy arguments involved. However, her position on the issue remains
unclear.
The application of the humanitarian law of armed conflict to wars of
national liberation, states Wilson, has met less resistance than the at-
tempt to legitimize the resort to force by national liberation move-
ments.46 This is an overstatement. It is a truism that the extension of the
authority to use force runs directly counter to the general trend of twen-
tieth-century international legal developments towards a jus contra bel-
lum.47 However, the application of the laws of armed conflict to wars of
national liberation has met as much, if not more, resistance as the at-
tempt to legitimize the resort to force by national liberation movements.
The crucial question centers on a policy consideration: should wars of
national liberation be treated as international armed conflicts subject to
customary and conventional international law, or as mere civil wars, also
referred to as "armed conflicts not of an international character"? 48 Res-
olution of this critical issue has direct legal, political, and military conse-
quences. If wars of national liberation are international armed conflicts,
much more of the behavior of all the parties to the conflict would become
legally cognizable under the four 1949 Geneva Conventions in their en-
tirety, together with the 'ensemble of customary and conventional law
applicable to such conflicts. 49 On the other hand, if wars of national
liberation are civil wars, the only applicable law would be the norms re-
ferred to in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 50 which is
46. Id. at 149.
47. Id.
48. T. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTEC-
TION 18 (1987).
49. Reisman & Silk, Which Law Applies to the Afghan Conflict?, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 459,
460 (1988).
50. Common Article 3 gives a set of minimum conditions applicable in the case of armed
conffict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Con-
tracting Parties. See Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention on Wounded Armed
Forces in the Field, supra note 6; Geneva Convention on Wounded Armed Forces at Sea,
supra note 6; Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, supra note 6; Geneva Convention on
Protection of Civilians, supra note 6.
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widely viewed as being much less comprehensive than the legal regime
defined in Common Article 2.5 1
The U.N. General Assembly has consistently called for the application
of the Geneva Conventions to armed conflicts involving national libera-
tion movements, thus implicitly characterizing them as international
conflicts. For example, at its 28th session, the Assembly proclaimed that
these struggles were armed conflicts under the Geneva Conventions:
The armed conflicts involving the struggle of peoples against colonial and
alien domination and racist regimes are to be regarded as international
armed conflicts in the sense of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the legal
status envisaged to apply to the combatants in the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions and other international instruments is to apply to the persons engaged
in armed struggle against colonial and alien domination and racist
regimes.
52
The most recent relevant convention on the law of armed conflict clas-
sifies wars involving national liberation movements as international
armed conflicts. Article 1(4) of Protocol 153 is deceptively simple:
The situations [covered in this Convention] ... include armed conflicts in
which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation
and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determina-
tion, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.54
It will be noticed that Article 1(4) refers both to armed conflicts in situa-
tions known as wars of national liberation and to the right of self-deter-
mination. In essence, Article 1(4) of Protocol I seems to provide for all
the important issues raised in International Law and the Use of Force by
National Liberation Movements.
51. Several authors argue that the effective application of Common Article 3's provisions is
contingent on the discretion and good faith of the parties to the conflict, and that the article
does not provide adequate protection in wars of national liberation. See, e.g., K. SUTER, AN
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF GUERRILLA WARFARE 17 (1984) (Common Article 3 of Geneva
Conventions suffered from "the lack of clear applicability to guerrilla warfare in general and
guerrillas in particular," and its provisions "were vague enough to permit a variety of interpre-
tations even in a conventional non-international conflict."); Baxter, lus in Bello Interno: The
Present and Future Law, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 518, 527-29 (J.
Moore ed. 1974) ("Article 3 does not afford enough protection, and the application of the
Conventions as a whole tends to be politically unacceptable and unworkable.... The obliga-
tions of Article 3 are cast in such general terms and leave so many things unsaid that they
cannot, even under the best of circumstances, be an adequate guide to the conduct of belliger-
ents in civil strife.").
52. G.A. Res. 3103, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/9628 (1973).
53. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature
Dec. 12, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977).
54. Id. at art. 1, para. 4.
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Wilson's discussion on the subject is inadequate because she does not
provide the reader with an in-depth discussion of the implications of Ar-
ticle 1(4). This failure is all the'more surprising because Article 1(4)
engendered so much controversy that it has been referred to as "[t]he
most controversial clause in the Additional Protocols." 55
Wilson's failure to devote more than six pages of her book to Article
1(4) may be explained by the need to maintain a definable boundary be-
tween thejus ad bellum and thejus in bello. Indeed, some of the strong-
est criticisms of Article 1(4) stem from the perceived need for such a
demarcation: the criticisms are that Article 1(4) "introduced the regret-
table innovation of making the motives behind a conflict a criterion for
the application of humanitarian law," 56 that it sought to legitimize na-
tional liberation movements, 57 and that it sanctioned the use of force and
introduced the return of the "just war" doctrine.58
Although the law of war has sometimes been applied in wars of na-
tional liberation, "there are significant exceptions to this rule and it can-
not be considered a customary rule of international law." 59 A significant
number of major military powers still have not ratified or acceded to the
Protocol. Even among Contracting Parties, no state has incorporated the
new provisions of Protocol I into its military manual. As Wilson states,
"the scope of Article 1(4) is actually very limited," and "[i]f it opens up a
Pandora's box at all, it is an unexpectedly small one." 6" Nevertheless,
Wilson does not make enough of an effort to inform the reader about all
aspects of Article 1(4). One of the most basic, and also most difficult,
questions faced by scholars and practitioners of public international law
is determining what state practice is with respect to any given area of
customary law. This problem is particularly pronounced in the area of
55. Dinstein, The New Geneva Protocols: A Step Forward or Backward?, 33 Y.B. WORLD
AFF. 265, 266 (1979). On the problems raised by the introduction of Article 1(4) at the 1974
Diplomatic Conference, see generally Forsythe, The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on Humani-
tarian Law: Some Observations, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 77, 78-88 (1975).
56. Summary Record of the 36th Plenary Meeting, VI OFF. Racs., CDDH/SR. 36 at 46,
para. 83 (statement by Mr. Freeland, U.K. representative).
57. Dinstein, supra note 55, at 267 ("What Article 1(4) professes to do is to confer a priori
a belligerent status on all liberation movements despite the absence of recognition and heedless
of the actual dimensions of the rebellion.").
58. Graham, The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on the Law of War: A Victory for Political
Causes and a Return to the "Just War" Concept of the Eleventh Century, 32 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 25, 41 (1975); Letter of Transmittal from President Reagan, PROTOCOL II ADDITIONAL
TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS, AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, S. TREATY Doc. No. 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
111 (1987), reprinted in 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 910 (1987) (statement by President Reagan to
Congress giving reasons for U.S. decision not to ratify Protocol I); Sofaer, The Rationale for
U.S. Decision, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 784, 784-87 (1988) (containing similar language).
59. WILSON, at 179.
60. Id. at 168.
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armed conflict. In this respect, Wilson's discussion on the jus in bello in
wars of national liberation is the weakest section of the book. Whether
Article 1(4) has been invoked in the international arena, for example,
receives short shrift. Wilson ignores the fact that claims have already
been made concerning the applicability of Article 1(4) to ongoing
conflicts.
61
Wilson gives few examples of the actual practice of states, and among
those given, the events of the distant past prevail.62 This may be a result
of her conclusion that states against which the drafters of Article 1(4)
intended it to be directed, such as Israel and South Africa, have not ac-
ceded to the Protocol. Yet the South African courts have recognized the
emerging norm that prisoners who were captured while openly fighting
in a characteristic uniform against a racist, colonial or foreign regime are
entitled to prisoner of war status, as well as treatment. In the case of S. v.
Sagarius En Andere,63 for example, in imposing a sentence on three
SWAPO guerrillas, the court accepted the public international law as-
pects of the case as being relevant mitigating factors. Among the factors
it took into consideration were the following:
the I.C.J. and other UN Organs and international actors had branded the
South African presence in Namibia as illegal; the SWAPO guerrillas re-
garded their actions as part of a just conflict with strong local and foreign
support; [and]... there is a tendency in general international law to accord
prisoner of war status to captives that openly participate in a characteristic
uniform in an armed conflict against a racist, colonial or foreign regime.
64
61. For example, Cassese has stated:
Art[icle] 1(4), however, has a legal scope too. It is not confined [to struggles between the
PLO and Israel, and between SWAPO and South Africa]; it can apply to other, fresh
situations as well, witness the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which no doubt comes
within the purview of the rule although the USSR has not ratified the Protocol and will
probably refrain from doing so in the near future, as well as the Indonesian occupation of
East Timor or the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. To all these situations both
Art[icle] 1(4) and the general principles on warfare that it renders operative, should be
deemed applicable. If in point of fact it has not been applied, this cannot be taken to
mean that States do not feel bound by it.
Cassese, Wars of National Liberation and Humanitarian Law, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES 313, 324 (C. Swinarski
ed. 1984). See also Reisman, supra note 39, at 908 (arguing that conflict in Afghanistan comes
under Article 1(4) of Protocol I).
62. For example, she discusses the Algerian war of 1954 and the Nigerian civil war of
1967. See WILSON, at 151-55. However, the Namibian conflict and the PLO uprising in the
Middle East, both of which seem to have intensified after the introduction of Article 1(4), are
relegated to a few lines of discussion. See id. at 160-62.
63. 1983 1 SA 833 (SWA).
64. Id. at 836. However, in S. v. Mogoerane and Others, (unpublished, but discussed in
Murray, The 1977 Geneva Protocols and Conflict in Southern Africa, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
462 (1984)), three accused ANC members who had been involved in attacks on South African
police stations were denied prisoner of war status and sentenced to death. The court in
Yale Journal of International Law
A discussion of such domestic cases, including those of nonsignatory
states, would have illuminated Wilson's analysis of emerging norms in
the practice of states.
Conclusion
International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Move-
ments gives the reader an insight into the legal and policy arguments
pertaining to the use of force by national liberation movements. Unfor-
tunately the value and importance of the book is greatly diminished by
the fundamental inconsistencies in Wilson's thesis and arguments.
Although Wilson fails to state her position on many of the issues dis-
cussed, certain conclusions on the issues can be made. The book's basic,
albeit hidden, premise is unassailable: the principle of self-determination
has become so widely accepted that the use of force to secure it may be
justifiedA5 Recent trends in state practice point to an emerging norm
that wars of national liberation are now considered international wars to
which international law must apply. 66 Wilson's book serves the limited
but useful purpose of introducing the reader to emerging trends in state
practice on the use of force by national liberation movements. Despite its
numerous flaws, it can serve well as introductory reading material on the
topic.
Mogoerane did not consider the international law aspects of the case as relevant, holding that
the ANC members involved had failed to distinguish themselves from ordinary civilians while
carrying out the attacks.
65. WILSON, at 187.
66. ia
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